Data table

China does not disclose the total number of nuclear-capable (including dual-capable) delivery vehicles it possesses.

The DPRK does not disclose the total number of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles it possesses.

The Indian government does not disclose the total number of nuclear-capable (including dual-capable) delivery vehicles it possesses. It does, however, periodically announce the testing or commissioning of new delivery systems.

Israel has a strict, long-standing policy of refusing to confirm or deny anything, either directly or indirectly, about its nuclear weapons status. The Israeli government treats any information that may have significance in that regard as classified and stringently enforces its domestic censorship.

Pakistan has never disclosed the total number of nuclear-capable (including dual-capable) delivery vehicles it possesses.

Russia does not publicly disclose the total number of its nuclear-capable delivery vehicles. Under the now-expired New START agreement signed in 2010, Russia provided data to the United States on deployed intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers, until suspending participation in the Treaty in February 2023. Russia also provides limited information about its nuclear delivery vehicles in national reports submitted to review conferences of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 2005.

The UK government does not disclose its total number of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, which consist solely of the Trident II (D5) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The 2021 Integrated Review stated that the government intended to extend its ‘long-standing policy of deliberate ambiguity and no longer give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers.’ The 2025 Strategic Defence Review and the 2025 National Security Strategy provided no details on missile numbers or deployments.

Israel has a strict, long-standing policy of refusing to confirm or deny anything, either directly or indirectly, about its nuclear weapons status. The Israeli government treats any information that may have significance in that regard as classified and stringently enforces its domestic censorship.

Russia does not disclose all the different types of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles it possesses. Under the now-expired New START agreement signed in 2010, Russia provided data to the United States on types of deployed and non-deployed strategic missiles and their launchers as well as heavy bombers, until suspending its participation in the Treaty in February 2023. Information about certain types of nuclear-capable systems is also occasionally disclosed through official statements and government press releases.

China does not disclose information about its fissile material production or reprocessing facilities used for nuclear weapons purposes.

Israel has a strict, long-standing policy of refusing to confirm or deny anything, either directly or indirectly, about its nuclear weapons status. The Israeli government treats any information that may have significance in that regard as classified and stringently enforces its domestic censorship.

China does not disclose its total holdings of fissile materials.

The DPRK does not disclose its total holdings of low-enriched uranium, highly enriched uranium, or plutonium.

France does not disclose its total holdings of low-enriched uranium, highly enriched uranium, or plutonium. However, it has transparently dismantled the facilities that it formerly used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons (in Pierrelatte and Marcoule).

India does not disclose its total holdings of uranium or plutonium. While there is complete transparency on the imported natural uranium fuel from other countries to meet India’s nuclear energy needs, the government does not disclose whether any quantity of imported fuel is enriched or whether the spent fuel from reactors is reprocessed to extract plutonium. Most of the foreign-built reactors and imported fuel are under IAEA safeguards, preventing diversion to military purposes.

Israel has a strict, long-standing policy of refusing to confirm or deny anything, either directly or indirectly, about its nuclear weapons status. The Israeli government treats any information that may have significance in that regard as classified and stringently enforces its domestic censorship.

Pakistan has not disclosed its fissile material stockpiles or production capacity.

Russia does not disclose its total holdings of low-enriched uranium, highly enriched uranium, or plutonium. Russia only publicly discloses information about its civilian stock of plutonium under Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549) published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Russia provides limited information about its historical fissile material disposition programmes through national reports on its implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), submitted to NPT Review Conferences since 2005.

The Indian government does not clearly disclose whether it uses artificial intelligence in systems related to nuclear weapons development, deployment, and use. Official reports by the Indian Ministry of Defence only mention the use of AI in conventional warfighting and to combat threats like border incursions and terrorism. Any public discussion on the nexus between AI systems and nuclear command, control, communications, computing, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) is avoided.

Israel has a strict, long-standing policy of refusing to confirm or deny anything, either directly or indirectly, about its nuclear weapons status. The Israeli government treats any information that may have significance in that regard as classified and stringently enforces its domestic censorship.

Pakistan has not disclosed its operational policies and practices regarding the use of AI in systems related to nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan does not support the use of AI in nuclear decision-making processes as it could undermine the rationale of deterrence that rests on human factors alone.

Russia does not disclose its policies or operational practices regarding the use of artificial intelligence in systems related to the development, deployment, and employment of nuclear weapons. However, statements from senior military officials indicate a general view on such policies and practices and potential areas for the application of AI.

There is no official UK government statement, parliamentary record, or defence policy document that describes the application, limits, or governance of artificial intelligence in relation to the UK’s nuclear command, control and communications system; early-warning or decision-support systems; or the development, targeting, or employment of nuclear weapons.

Israel has a strict, long-standing policy of refusing to confirm or deny anything, either directly or indirectly, about its nuclear weapons status. The Israeli government treats any information that may have significance in that regard as classified and stringently enforces its domestic censorship.

Pakistan does not disclose any plans for the modernisation of its nuclear arsenal or related facilities.

Israel has a strict, long-standing policy of refusing to confirm or deny anything, either directly or indirectly, about its nuclear weapons status. The Israeli government treats any information that may have significance in that regard as classified and stringently enforces its domestic censorship.

Pakistan supports the idea of Negative Security Assurance (NSA) for non-nuclear-armed states. This position is reflected in Pakistan’s statements made at the Conference On Disarmament in Geneva.

Israel has a strict, long-standing policy of refusing to confirm or deny anything, either directly or indirectly, about its nuclear weapons status. The Israeli government treats any information that may have significance in that regard as classified and stringently enforces its domestic censorship.

China does not publicly disclose its position on how it accounts for the impact of strategic, non-nuclear technologies in its doctrine on the employment of nuclear weapons.

Israel has a strict, long-standing policy of refusing to confirm or deny anything, either directly or indirectly, about its nuclear weapons status. The Israeli government treats any information that may have significance in that regard as classified and stringently enforces its domestic censorship.

Pakistan has not disclosed any information regarding how it accounts for and responds to strategic, non-nuclear technologies in its doctrine on the employment of nuclear weapons.

The UK government does not disclose in detail how it accounts for or would respond to strategic, non-nuclear technologies (for example, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite weapons, hypersonic or precision-strike systems) in its doctrine governing the employment of nuclear weapons.

China does not disclose its total number of nuclear warheads, either actively deployed or in storage, nor does it comment on others’ assessments of that number.

The DPRK government does not disclose the number of nuclear warheads it possesses.

Until March 2026, France consistently indicated that it possessed less than 300 nuclear warheads, both in written documents and in Presidential speeches. In March 2026, President Macron announced that this number would be increased and that it would no longer be made public.

The Indian government does not disclose the total number of nuclear warheads in its arsenal, or any details on the sites used for production and storage of nuclear warheads. India pursues a policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence, meaning the country maintains a nuclear arsenal that the government believes is sufficient to provide maximum credibility with minimum forces dedicated to the role.

Israel has a strict, long-standing policy of refusing to confirm or deny anything, either directly or indirectly, about its nuclear weapons status. The Israeli government treats any information that may have significance in that regard as classified and stringently enforces its domestic censorship.

Pakistan has never declared the total number of nuclear warheads in its stockpile.

Russia does not publicly disclose the total number of nuclear warheads in its arsenal. Under the now-expired New START agreement, Russia provided data to the United States on the number of deployed strategic warheads in its arsenal, until suspending its participation in the agreement in February 2023. Limited information is also provided through Russia’s national reports on its implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) submitted to NPT Review Conferences since 2015.

China does not disclose the yields of its various nuclear warheads.

The DPRK has made no official disclosures regarding the exact yield of its nuclear warheads. However, DPRK state media reported that the country’s sixth nuclear test, in September 2017, was of a hydrogen bomb with an adjustable yield of tens to hundreds of kilotons.

France no longer reveals any information on the yield of its two types of nuclear warheads, the Oceanic Nuclear Warhead (TNO) used on submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the Airborne Nuclear Warhead (TNA) used on airborne cruise missiles.

The Indian government does not disclose the exact yield of its nuclear warheads, but it has revealed information about the yields of the nuclear test explosions it conducted in May, 1998.

Israel has a strict, long-standing policy of refusing to confirm or deny anything, either directly or indirectly, about its nuclear weapons status. The Israeli government treats any information that may have significance in that regard as classified and stringently enforces its domestic censorship.

Pakistan does not disclose the explosive yields of its nuclear warheads.

Russia does not publicly disclose the yields of its various nuclear warheads.

The United Kingdom does not disclose the explosive yield of its nuclear warheads.

The United States does not disclose the exact yields of the warheads in its current arsenal. However, it has declassified the yields of many of its historical detonations and the historical stockpile megatonnage, and occasionally provides details about the yields of current warheads relative to those of other warheads.