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Pakistan does not have a published doctrine on nuclear weapons use, although it does make periodic statements on the topic through public speeches and disclosures by senior military leadership. These statements include the rationale for Pakistan’s policies on the development and employment of nuclear weapons and address its specific threat perceptions regarding India. [1][2] Similarly, on arms control and disarmament related issues, Pakistan has regularly stated its positions through its Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.[3]
Pakistan has not disclosed any details on operational issues related to nuclear weapons, including the total number and yields of nuclear warheads in its arsenal, or details about those that are active, deployed, in storage, or awaiting dismantlement. It has also not disclosed the total number of nuclear-capable (including dual-capable) delivery vehicles it possesses.
However, via official government media channels Pakistan has shared information on the different types of nuclear-capable (including dual-capable) delivery vehicles it possesses. These official statements generally include ranges and salient characteristics of the delivery systems related to the dominant Pakistani threat perception emanating from India. [4][5][6][7][8][9]
Regarding Negative Security Assurances (NSAs), Pakistan advocates for a legally binding convention to commit nuclear-armed states to NSAs. It is of the view that this proposal is most ripe for treaty negotiations and has significant potential to create the necessary environment for confidence building and easing of tensions.[3]
Regarding the use of artificial intelligence in systems related to nuclear weapons, Pakistan has not disclosed its policies and operational practices. However, it does not support the use of AI in nuclear decision-making processes as it could undermine the rationale of deterrence that rests on human factors alone.[7] Pakistan has also not disclosed any information about how it accounts for and responds to strategic non-nuclear technologies in its nuclear weapons doctrine.
Pakistan and India have a bilateral agreement on advance notification of ballistic missile test launches, but the agreement does not cover cruise missiles, satellite launch vehicles, or military exercises involving nuclear and dual-capable weapons systems. The agreement was negotiated as a confidence building measure between the two sides and to preclude the possibility of miscommunication.[8]
Pakistan has not disclosed plans for the modernisation or future development of its nuclear arsenal, nor has it explained the strategic rationale that could lead to potential changes in the future.
Pakistan has never disclosed the total number of nuclear-capable (including dual-capable) delivery vehicles it possesses.
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Pakistan has disclosed all the different types of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles it possesses, including some that are dual-capable (nuclear/conventional). Lt. Gen. (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, an advisor to the National Command Authority of Pakistan, has stated that the country ‘possesses the full spectrum of nuclear weapons in three categories: strategic, operational and tactical, with full range coverage of the large Indian land mass and its outlying territories.’[9]
Official media outlets of the Pakistani government, including the media agency of the Pakistani military, the Inter Services Press Relations (ISPR), regularly post announcements of tests and drills related to nuclear-capable delivery systems.[10] These provide varying details about the name, role, range, and capabilities of Pakistani nuclear delivery systems, including ballistic missiles, ground and air-launched cruise missiles, and maritime nuclear capabilities.
An indicative – but not exhaustive – sample of the types of information published includes details about the following Pakistani nuclear-capable delivery systems:
A ground-launched, dual-capable cruise missile, the Babur, was initially announced in 2011.[1] The ISPR then announced in 2016 that the range of the Babur system had been upgraded to 700km,[2] and in 2017, announced the successful test-launch of a submarine-launched version of the missile with a range of 450km.[3]
In 2011, the ISPR announced a successful test of the dual-capable air-launched cruise missile, the Ra’ad.[4] In 2020, the ISPR announced the successful first flight of the Ra’ad-II, which they stated had a longer range of 600km.[5]
The ISPR also made announcements related to the development of short-range ballistic missiles: the 60-70km-range Nasr in 2017, [6] and an operational training launch of the 290km-range Ghaznavi in 2020. [7]
The existence of longer-range ballistic missile systems has also been announced, including a successful test-launch of the 2,750km-range Shaheen-III in 2021, among others. [8]
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Pakistan has not publicly disclosed any information about the fissile material production or reprocessing facilities it possesses that are used for nuclear weapons purposes. However, Pakistan and India engage in a mutual exchange of data about their nuclear facilities once a year, under a 1988 ‘Non-Attack Agreement’ that commits both parties not to attack the nuclear facilities of the other. [1]
The Agreement, which entered into force in 1991, commits the two parties to ‘refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country.’ To facilitate this, each party commits to inform the other on 1 January each year of ‘the latitude and longitude of its nuclear installations and facilities and whenever there is any change.’ As defined in the Agreement, this includes ‘nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, iso-topes separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radio-active materials.’[1] The annual exchange of facilities lists has been maintained since 1 January 1992.[2]
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Pakistan has not disclosed its total holdings of low-enriched uranium, highly-enriched uranium, or plutonium, nor has it disclosed its production capacities in regard to these materials.
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Pakistan has not disclosed its operational policies and practices regarding the use of AI in systems related to nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan does not support the use of AI in nuclear decision making processes as it could undermine the rationale of deterrence that rests on human factors alone.
In a working paper submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in 2023, Pakistan stated: ‘The development, deployment, integration and use of AI for military purposes, as well as autonomous weapon systems entail serious repercussions for security and stability at the international and regional levels. These capabilities, when developed and employed without any guardrails, can exacerbate nuclear risks. And when these capabilities are integrated with policies relating to nuclear force posture as well as employment, they can lead to miscalculations, accidents and thereby catastrophic consequences. Concepts of deterrence escalation and risk reduction heavily rely on human rationality, caution, perception and management of the situation politically. Perceived or real absence of human factor renders these concepts without their traditional meaning with risk of automating escalation.’[1]
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Pakistan does not disclose any plans for the modernisation or future development of its nuclear arsenal, including facilities related to the production and storage of nuclear warheads, fissile material for weapons purposes, or nuclear-capable delivery systems.
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Pakistan supports the idea of Negative Security Assurance (NSA) for non-nuclear-armed states. At the Conference On Disarmament in Geneva, the country has advocated for a legally binding convention on NSAs, stating that this proposal ‘is most ripe for treaty negotiations and has the significant potential to create the necessary environment for confidence building and easing of tensions.’[1]
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Through official statements and speeches by senior officials, Pakistan has publicly disclosed its doctrine of ‘full spectrum deterrence’, which is ‘designed to comprehensively deter large-scale aggression against mainland Pakistan’. This doctrine includes concepts that guide the country's nuclear weapons policies but does not elaborate specific situations in which Pakistan would consider the employment of nuclear weapons.
In the words of Lt. Gen. (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, an Advisor to the National Command Authority of Pakistan, the country’s nuclear doctrine is based on a ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence capability, while remaining within the larger philosophy of Credible Minimum Deterrence.’ It is explicitly framed in terms of deterring and countering threats from India, including India’s ‘advantages of relative conventional asymmetry.’[1][3] The doctrine features ‘seamless integration between nuclear strategy and conventional military strategy’, and a ‘large variety of strategic, operational and tactical nuclear weapons, on land, air and sea, which are designed to comprehensively deter large-scale aggression against mainland Pakistan.’[2]
According to Lt. Gen. (Retd) Kidwai, the Full Spectrum Deterrence doctrine implies:
‘That Pakistan possesses the full spectrum of nuclear weapons in three categories: strategic, operational and tactical, with full range coverage of the large Indian land mass and its outlying territories; there is no place for India’s strategic weapons to hide.
That Pakistan possesses an entire range of weapons yield coverage in terms of kilotons (KT), and the numbers strongly secured, to deter the adversary’s declared policy of massive retaliation; Pakistan’s ‘counter-massive retaliation’ can therefore be as severe if not more.
That Pakistan retains the liberty of choosing from a full spectrum of targets in a “target-rich India”, notwithstanding the indigenous Indian BMD or the Russian S-400, to include counter value, counter force and battlefield targets.’[1]
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Pakistan does not issue public notifications in advance of all missile tests and military exercises involving nuclear-capable systems.
However, both Pakistan and India do share information with each other through official channels as part of a bilateral agreement signed in 2005, which commits them to providing advance notification to each other of ballistic missile test launches, covering ‘land or sea launched, surface-to-surface ballistic missile[s]’. It does not cover cruise missiles, satellite launch vehicles, or military exercises involving nuclear and dual-capable weapons systems.[1]
The 2005 agreement commits each party to notify the other ‘no less than three days in advance of the commencement of a five day launch window within which it intends to undertake flight tests’. The agreement also commits the parties to issue ‘notice to airmen’ (NOTAMs) and ‘Navigational Areas’ (NAVAREAs) via their respective authorities.
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Pakistan has not disclosed any information regarding how it accounts for and responds to strategic, non-nuclear technologies in its doctrine on the employment of nuclear weapons.
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Pakistan has never shared the total number of nuclear warheads in its nuclear arsenal, including those that are deployed, in storage, or awaiting dismantlement.
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Pakistan does not disclose the explosive yields of its nuclear warheads.
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