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DPRK

National Summary

The DPRK does not disclose the number of nuclear warheads it possesses, any detailed breakdown of its arsenal, or its total holdings of fissile materials.

Public disclosures from the DPRK regarding its fissile material production serve to demonstrate the existence of the relevant facilities, but do not reveal their specific outputs, capacity, or the related fissile material stockpiles.

The DPRK also does not disclose information about its policies or practices related to the integration of AI and other emerging technologies into its nuclear weapon systems. However, the country’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un has stated that the integration of AI technologies is a top priority for its military modernization.[16]

The DPRK has occasionally issued pre-notification of some missile test launches or space launch activities to international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, and the International Civil Aviation Organization.[11][12] However, the cadence of these notifications is inconsistent, and their release does not constitute a regular or comprehensive practice across all missile tests and space launch activities.[13][14][15]

While few details are released overall on the nuclear weapons programme, the DPRK has disclosed more information about the programme in recent years than it tended to previously. For example, the DPRK’s publicly released five-year plan from 2021 includes discussion of defence issues and offered rare insights into its strategic priorities.[17]

Similarly, statements released by the state news agency, KCNA, after each of the six nuclear tests the DPRK has conducted to date have gradually become more detailed, including as regards the rationale for its nuclear weapons. After the fourth nuclear test on 6 January 2016, which the DPRK described as its first hydrogen bomb test, KCNA provided a clearer timeline for the decision-making process than it had previously.[6] Kim Jong Un ‘issued an order to conduct the first H-bomb test … on December 15, Juche 104 (2015) … and then signed the final written order on January 3, Juche 105 (2016)].’[5]
After the fifth nuclear test, on 9 September 2016, the KCNA announcement stated ‘The standardization of the nuclear warhead will enable the DPRK to produce at will, and as many as it wants, a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power with a firm hold on the technology for producing and using various fissile materials.’[7] Throughout all six tests, official DPRK communications have consistently emphasised the safe testing conditions and the self-defensive nature of the nuclear and missile programmes.[1][2][3][6][7][8]

The 2022 law on Nuclear Forces Policy governs North Korean nuclear weapons. The 2022 law provides clearer command-and-control provisions for nuclear use than the 2013 law that it replaced,[4] and it lists a set of conditions in which the DPRK would consider using nuclear weapons.[9] These include:

1. if a nuclear attack or an attack by another weapon of mass destruction has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;

2. if a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on the state leadership or the state nuclear command apparatus by hostile forces has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;

3. if major strategic assets of the state have suffered a devastating military attack or when such an attack is judged to be imminent;

4. if there is an unavoidable operational need during a crisis to prevent the escalation or prolongation of war and to seize the initiative in the war; or

5. if there is no choice but to respond with nuclear weapons following the occurrence of a crisis with devastating consequences for the survival of the state or the lives and safety of the people.

Over the last few years, the DPRK has publicly articulated a non-negotiable rejection of the concept of ‘denuclearization’. At the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly in 2025, Kim Jong Un reiterated this rejection, saying ‘The concept of denuclearization has already lost its meaning…Asking us to accept denuclearization now is as good as asking us to go against our Constitution… denuclearization is the last, last thing to expect from us.’[10] This also illustrates a sense of strategic transparency; while remaining opaque about many of its capabilities and operational policies, the DPRK uses transparency selectively to clarify red lines.

Official sources

  1. ^ KCNA. ‘Successful Underground Nuclear Test’ [지하핵시험 성공], October 9, 2006. http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2006/10/10-10/2006-1009-008.html
  2. ^ KCNA. ‘Successful Conducted Underground Nuclear Test’ [지하핵시험을 성과적으로 진행]. May 25, 2009. http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2009/05/05-25/2009-0525-012.html
  3. ^ KCNA. ‘KCNA Report on Successful 3rd Underground Nuclear Test’ [조선중앙통신사 보도 제3차 지하핵시험을 성공적으로 진행]. February 12, 2013. http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2013/02/02-12/2013-0212-016.html
  4. ^ KCNA. ‘Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State Adopted’ [자위적핵보유국의 지위를 더욱 공고히 할데 대한 법 채택]. April 1, 2013. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2013/04/04-01/2013-0401-030.html
  5. ^ KCNA. ‘WPK Central Committee Issues Order to Conduct First H-Bomb Test’ [김정은제1비서 첫 수소탄시험에 대한 명령 하달,최종명령서에 수표]. January 6, 2016. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2016/201601/news06/20160106-11ee.html
  6. ^ KCNA. ‘DPRK Proves Successful in H-bomb Test’ [조선정부 주체조선의 첫 수소탄시험 완전성공]. January 6, 2016. http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2016/01/01-06/2016-0106-011.html
  7. ^ KCNA. ‘Nuclear Weapons Institute Succeeds in Nuclear Warhead Explosion Test.’ [조선 핵무기연구소 핵탄두폭발시험에 성공]. September 9, 2016. http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2016/09/09-09/2016-0909-020.html
  8. ^ KCNA. ‘Nuclear Weapons Institute on Successful Test of H-bomb for ICBM’ [조선핵무기연구소 대륙간탄도로케트장착용 수소탄시험 성공]. September 3, 2017. http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2017/09/09-03/2017-0903-016.html
  9. ^ KCNA. ‘Supreme People’s Assembly adopted the Nuclear Forces Policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea’ [최고인민회의 법령 《조선민주주의인민공화국 핵무력정책에 대하여]. September 9, 2022. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2022/09/09-09/2022-0909-021.html
  10. ^ KCNA. ‘Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un’s speech at the 13th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ [김정은총비서 최고인민회의 제14기 제13차회의에서 연설]. September 22, 2025. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2025/09/09-22/2025-0922-002.html
  11. ^ KCNA. ‘조선중앙통신사 보도 위성발사에 다른 나라 전문가들 조청 [KCNA Reports about Preparations for Satellite Launch].’ March 17, 2012. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201203/news17/20120317-33ee.html
  12. ^ United Nations Security Council. ‘Letter dated 4 February 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.’ February 4, 2016. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2016/117
  13. ^ International Maritime Organization. ‘Meeting summaries for Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), 97th session, 21-25 November 2016.’ https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/meetingsummaries/pages/msc-97th-session.aspx
  14. ^ International Maritime Organization. ‘Meeting summaries for Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 107), 31 May-9 June 2023.’ https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/meetingsummaries/pages/msc-107th-session.aspx
  15. ^ KCNA. ‘조선국가해사감독국 국제해사기구의 불공정한 립장 규탄 [Press Statement of DPRK Maritime Administration Spokesperson].’ June 8, 2023. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202306/news08/20230608-05ee.html
  16. ^ KCNA. ‘경애하는 김정은동지께서 무인항공기술련합체와 탐지전자전연구집단의 연구사업 지도 [Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Defence Science Research Work].’ March 27, 2025. http://www.youth.rep.kp/index.php/article/2025/03/27/1?title_keyword=&content_keyword=
  17. ^ KCNA. ‘Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-Style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory: On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at 8th Congress of WPK’ (original as published in English), 9 January 2021. https://web.archive.org/web/20231221213645/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2021/202101/news09/20210109-02ee.html
DPRK

Delivery vehicle numbers

Doesn’t disclose

The DPRK does not disclose the total number of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles it possesses. However, state media (KCNA) reveals certain information about delivery vehicles when reporting on missile tests or the unveiling of new weapons systems.

At a ceremony in August 2024, for example, Kim Jung-Un handed over 250 ‘new-type tactical ballistic missile launchers’ to the ‘frontier military units.’[1]

Official sources

  1. ^ KCNA. ‘Ceremony for Celebrating Transfer of New-Type Tactical Ballistic Missile Weapon System Takes Place with Splendor’ [강군현대화위업의 확고한 승세를 과시하는 절대병기들의 출정식 신형전술탄도미싸일무기체계 인계인수기념식 성대히 거행]. August 5, 2024. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202408/news05/20240805-02ee.html
  2. [2] [b] KCNA. ‘Parade to Celebrate the 80th Anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea - Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Participates’ [조선로동당창건 80돐경축 열병식-김정은총비서 참가]. October 11, 2025. http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2025/10/10-11/2025-1011-001.html

Last updated: 2 May 2026 05:54

Delivery vehicle types

Partially discloses

Overall, the DPRK discloses very limited information on its nuclear-capable delivery systems, usually on occasions such as missile test launches, visits by the country’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un to key military facilities, and major national events.

In 2013, DPRK state media (KCNA) reported that the country had conducted its third nuclear test with a ‘smaller, lighter atomic bomb’ and emphasized the importance of developing ‘more precise and miniaturized nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.’[1][2]

KCNA reported in March 2016 that the ‘nuclear warheads have been standardized to be suitable for ballistic missiles by miniaturizing them’ and ‘with a Korean-style structure of mixed charge.’[5]

In 2021, Kim Jong Un stated the intention to ‘make the existing nuclear weapons tactical ones.’[3] During the 2025 military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Worker’s Party of Korea, the Hwasongpho-20 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was presented as ‘the most powerful nuclear strategic weapon system.’[4]

Official sources

  1. ^ KCNA. ‘조선중앙통신사 보도 제3차 지하핵시험을 성공적으로 진행 [The third underground nuclear test was successfully conducted, according to the Korean Central News Agency].’ February 12, 2013. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2013/02/02-12/2013-0212-016.html
  2. ^ KCNA. ‘조선로동당 중앙위 3월전원회의 보고-로동신문 [Report on the March Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea - Rodong Sinmun].’ April 2, 2013. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2013/04/04-02/2013-0402-011.html
  3. ^ KCNA. ‘ 조선로동당 제8차대회에서 하신 김정은위원장의 보고에 대하여 [On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at 8th Congress of WPK].’ January 9, 2021. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2021/01/01-09/2021-0109-001.html
  4. ^ KCNA. ‘Parade to Celebrate the 80th Anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea - Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Participates’ [조선로동당창건 80돐경축 열병식-김정은총비서 참가]. October 11, 2025. http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2025/10/10-11/2025-1011-001.html
  5. ^ KCNA. ‘Kim Jong Un Guides Work for Increasing Nuclear Arsenal’ [김정은제1비서 핵무기연구부문의 핵무기병기화사업 지도] March 9, 2016. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2016/201603/news09/20160309-01ee.html

Last updated: 2 May 2026 05:54

Fissile material facilities

Partially discloses

The DPRK discloses little information about the types of fissile material production or reprocessing facilities it possesses that are used for nuclear weapons purposes.

Sites disclosed by the DPRK include Nyongbyon and a facility that was under construction in Taechon at one point, as referenced in the 1994 Agreed Framework signed between the DPRK and the United States.[1][2][3][6] In April 2009, in response to a statement from the president of the UN Security Council, the DPRK Foreign Ministry also stated an intention to build an experimental light-water reactor: ‘In case the UNSC does not make an immediate apology, we will…decide to build a light-water reactor power plant and begin immediately the technological development to ensure our own production of nuclear fuel.’[7]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs first publicly acknowledged the possession of a uranium enrichment capability in June 2009, when government media reported that in response to UNSC Resolution 1874, ‘The process of uranium enrichment will be commenced.’[9]

Official state media (KCNA) also occasionally mentions the names of facilities that produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes, such as the Nuclear Weapons Institute.[8] In 2025, it reported on Kim Jong Un’s interactions with scientists from the nuclear-material production base and the Nuclear Weapons Institute and posted photos of him inspecting the related facilities, though the DPRK has not disclosed their locations or technical parameters.[4][5]

Official sources

  1. ^ Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Geneva, October 21, 1994. http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf
  2. ^ International Atomic Energy Agency. Implementation of the Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/403). August 17, 1995. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc39-18_en.pdf
  3. ^ KCNA. ‘조선중앙통신사 보도 8,000여대의 페연료봉 재처리는 6월말에 완료 [KCNA Report: reprocessing of approximately 8,000 spent fuel rods was completed by the end of June.].’ October 4, 2003. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2003/10/10-04/2003-10-04-001.html
  4. ^ KCNA. ‘경애하는 김정은동지께서 핵물질생산기지와 핵무기연구소를 현지지도하시였다 [Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Nuclear-material Production Base and Nuclear Weapons Institute].’ January 29, 2025. http://www.kcna.kp/kp/article/q/cb8bae4be289a132e31b45035c49ad86.kcmsf
  5. ^ KCNA. ‘경애하는 김정은동지께서 핵관련분야의 과학자,기술자들을 만나시고 중요협의회를 지도하시였다 [Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un meets scientists and technicians in nuclear field and guides important consultative meeting].’ September 27, 2025. http://www.kcna.kp/kp/article/q/d0c32c4544c9185fe38490490d81ab2b.kcmsf
  6. ^ [f] KCNA. ‘김정은총비서 조선인민군 특수작전무력훈련기지 현지시찰 [Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Gives Field Guidance at Armoured Defensive Weapons Institute and Electronic Weapons Institute under Academy of Defence Sciences].’ 13 September 2024. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2025/202509/news13/20250913-03ee.html
  7. ^ International Atomic Energy Agency. Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24). September 2, 2011. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc55-24_en.pdf
  8. ^ KCNA. ‘조선외무성 성명 유엔안보리 사죄없으면 추가적자위조치 [The DPRK’s Foreign Ministry Statement: If the UN Security Council does not apologize, additional self-defense measures will be taken]. ‘ April 29, 2009. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2009/04/04-29/2009-0429-014.html
  9. ^ KCNA. ‘경애하는 김정은동지께서 핵무기연구소와 무기급핵물질생산기지를 현지지도하시였다 [Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Nuclear Weapons Institute and Production Base of Weapons-grade Nuclear Materials].’ September 13, 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20241009141534/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202409/news13/20240913-03ee.html
  10. [10] KCNA.‘ 조선외무성성명 플루토니움전량 무기화,우라니움농축작업 착수 [DPRK Foreign Ministry Declares Strong Counter- Measures against UNSC's "Resolution 1874"].’ June 13, 2009, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200906/news13/20090613-10ee.html

Last updated: 2 May 2026 05:54

Fissile material stocks

Doesn’t disclose

The DPRK does not disclose its total holdings of low-enriched uranium, highly enriched uranium, or plutonium.

Last updated: 2 May 2026 05:54

Integration of AI

Partially discloses

The DPRK does not publicly disclose its policies regarding the integration of AI into its nuclear weapons systems. However, the country’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong Un, has stated that the integration of AI technologies is a top priority for its military modernization.[1]

For example, during a visit to the Unmanned Aeronautical Technology Complex and the detective electronic warfare research group in March 2025, Kim stated that ‘in the effort to modernize the armed forces, the sectors of unmanned equipment and AI technology must be regarded as top priorities for development’.[1]

And at the opening ceremony of the Arms Equipment Exhibition in October 2025, Kim stressed the importance of ‘actively introducing AI and other cutting-edge technology which could not only expand our warfighting capabilities but also our adaptability to current and future battlefields.’[2]

Official sources

  1. ^ KCNA. ‘경애하는 김정은동지께서 무인항공기술련합체와 탐지전자전연구집단의 연구사업 지도 [Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Defence Science Research Work].’ March 27, 2025. http://www.youth.rep.kp/index.php/article/2025/03/27/1?title_keyword=&content_keyword=
  2. ^ KCNA. ‘김정은총비서 무장장비전시회 개막식에서 연설 [Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Spoke at Opening Ceremony of Military Hardware Exhibition Defence Development].’ October 10, 2025. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2025/10/10-05/2025-1005-002.html

Last updated: 2 May 2026 05:54

Modernisation plans

Does disclose

The DPRK has disclosed plans for the modernisation or future development of its nuclear arsenal and explained the strategic rationale for the proposed changes.

At the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in 2021, Kim Jong Un announced the modernization plan for the next five years to ‘further advance nuclear technology, the miniaturization and lightening of nuclear weapons, the development of tactical nuclear weapons, and the production of ultra-large nuclear warheads.’ This plan also include the ‘goal to improve the preemptive and retaliatory strike of nuclear forces…within the 15,000 km range’ and the ‘task to establish hypersonic glide combat unit in the near future, ground-based and sea-based solid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as nuclear-powered submarines and underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapons which are of important significance in raising the long-range nuclear strike capability.’[1]

Kim has stressed that the country will pursue ‘a rapid expansion of nuclearization’ and emphasized the important role of naval forces to perform as a part of ‘state nuclear forces and the realm of nuclear use in the near future.’[2]

Official sources

  1. ^ KCNA. ‘조선로동당 제8차대회에서 하신 김정은위원장의 보고에 대하여 [Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un’s report at the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea].’ January 9, 2021. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2021/01/01-09/2021-0109-001.html See also, KCNA. ‘김정은총비서 최고인민회의 제14기 제9차회의에서 연설 [Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at 9th Session of 14th SPA].’ September 28, 2023. http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2023/09/09-28/2023-0928-001.html
  2. ^ KCNA. ‘김정은총비서 신형구축함의 통합운영체계와 해병들의 훈련정형 료해 [Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Visits Destroyer Choe Hyon and Learns about Training and Life of Sailors]. ‘ August 19, 2025. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2025/08/08-19/2025-0819-001.html

Last updated: 2 May 2026 05:54

Negative security assurances

Partially discloses

According to the 2022 law on Nuclear Forces Policy, the DPRK states that it shall not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states if these states are not involved in ‘any aggression or attack against the DPRK in league with other nuclear-armed states].’[1]

In addition to this general provision that specifically mentions non-nuclear-armed states, Article 6 of the law on Nuclear Forces Policy outlines five conditions under which the DPRK would consider the use of nuclear weapons, and these conditions may be met regardless of whether an adversary is nuclear-armed or not:

1. if a nuclear attack or an attack by another weapon of mass destruction has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;

2. if a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on the state leadership or the state nuclear command apparatus by hostile forces has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;

3. if major strategic assets of the state have suffered a devastating military attack or when such an attack is judged to be imminent;

4. if there is an unavoidable operational need during a crisis to prevent the escalation or prolongation of war and to seize the initiative in the war; or

5. if there is no choice but to respond with nuclear weapons following the occurrence of a crisis with devastating consequences for the survival of the state or the lives and safety of the people.[1]

Official sources

  1. ^ KCNA. ‘최고인민회의 법령 《조선민주주의인민공화국 핵무력정책에 대하여》[Supreme People’s Assembly adopted the Nuclear Forces Policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea].’ September 9, 2022. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2022/09/09-09/2022-0909-021.html

Last updated: 2 May 2026 05:54

Nuclear doctrine

Does disclose

The DPRK has twice disclosed its laws governing the use of nuclear weapons. The current law on ‘Nuclear Forces Policy’, published in 2022, outlines five conditions in which the DPRK would consider the use of nuclear weapons. These are:
1. if a nuclear attack or an attack by another weapon of mass destruction has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;

2. if a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on the state leadership or the state nuclear command apparatus by hostile forces has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;

3. if major strategic assets of the state have suffered a devastating military attack or when such an attack is judged to be imminent;

4. if there is an unavoidable operational need during a crisis to prevent the escalation or prolongation of war and to seize the initiative in the war; or

5. if there is no choice but to respond with nuclear weapons following the occurrence of a crisis with devastating consequences for the survival of the state or the lives and safety of the people.[3]

The 2022 law on Nuclear Forces Policy replaced an older law from 2013 entitled ‘On Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State for Self-Defence.’[1][2]

Official sources

  1. ^ KCNA. ‘ 최고인민회의 제 12기 제7차회의[Seventh Session of 12th SPA of DPRK Held].’ April 1, 2013. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2013/04/04-01/2013-0401-026.html
  2. ^ KCNA. ‘자위적핵보유국의 지위를 더욱 공고히 할데 대한 법 채택 [Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State Adopted].’ April 1, 2013. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2013/04/04-01/2013-0401-030.html
  3. ^ KCNA. ‘최고인민회의 법령 《조선민주주의인민공화국 핵무력정책에 대하여》[Supreme People's Assembly adopted the Nuclear Forces Policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea].’ September 9, 2022. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2022/09/09-09/2022-0909-021.html

Last updated: 2 May 2026 05:54

Pre-notification of tests & exercises

Partially discloses

The DPRK has on occasion provided notifications to organizations such as the International Maritime Organization, International Telecommunications Union and International Civil Aviation Organization.[1][2] However, this is not a consistent practice for all its missiles tests and space launch activities.[3][4][5]

Official sources

  1. ^ KCNA. ‘조선중앙통신사 보도 위성발사에 다른 나라 전문가들 조청 [KCNA Reports about Preparations for Satellite Launch].’ March 17, 2012. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201203/news17/20120317-33ee.html
  2. ^ United Nations Security Council. ‘Letter dated 4 February 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.’ February 4, 2016. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2016/117
  3. ^ International Maritime Organization. ‘Meeting summaries for Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), 97th session, 21-25 November 2016.’ https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/meetingsummaries/pages/msc-97th-session.aspx
  4. ^ International Maritime Organization. ‘Meeting summaries for Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 107), 31 May-9 June 2023.’ https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/meetingsummaries/pages/msc-107th-session.aspx
  5. ^ KCNA. ‘조선국가해사감독국 국제해사기구의 불공정한 립장 규탄 [Press Statement of DPRK Maritime Administration Spokesperson].’ June 8, 2023. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202306/news08/20230608-05ee.html

Last updated: 2 May 2026 05:54

Strategic non-nuclear technologies

Does disclose

In its 2022 law on Nuclear Forces Policy, the DPRK discloses a range of circumstances in which it would consider using nuclear weapons.[1] These include situations in which the DPRK has suffered a strategic attack, or believes one is imminent, using non-nuclear means. The conditions are as follows:

1. if a nuclear attack or an attack by another weapon of mass destruction has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;

2. if a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on the state leadership or the state nuclear command apparatus by hostile forces has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;

3. if major strategic assets of the state have suffered a devastating military attack or when such an attack is judged to be imminent;

4. if there is an unavoidable operational need during a crisis to prevent the escalation or prolongation of war and to seize the initiative in the war; or

5. if there is no choice but to respond with nuclear weapons following the occurrence of a crisis with devastating consequences for the survival of the state or the lives and safety of the people.[1]

Official sources

  1. ^ KCNA. ‘최고인민회의 법령 《조선민주주의인민공화국 핵무력정책에 대하여》[Supreme People's Assembly adopted the Nuclear Forces Policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea].’ September 9, 2022. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2022/09/09-09/2022-0909-021.html

Last updated: 2 May 2026 05:54

Warhead numbers

Doesn’t disclose

The DPRK government does not disclose the total number of nuclear warheads in its arsenal, nor any details regarding the numbers of warheads in different functional categories. In December 2022, however, Kim Jong Un emphasized the intention to pursue ‘an exponential increase of the country’s nuclear arsenal’.[1]

Official sources

  1. ^ KCNA. ‘Report on 6th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of 8th WPK Central Committee’. January 1, 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/20240821160302/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202301/news01/20230101-18ee.html

Last updated: 2 May 2026 05:54

Warhead yields

Doesn’t disclose

The DPRK has not disclosed the exact yields of its nuclear warheads. However, state media (KCNA) has reported on a series of inspections conducted by the DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un during the development of the country’s nuclear arsenal, in which details about various warheads were disclosed.

For example, following an inspection conducted by Kim in March 2016, KCNA reported that the ‘nuclear warheads have been standardized to be suitable for ballistic missiles by miniaturizing them’ and ‘with a Korean-style structure of mixed charge.’[1]

Following the sixth nuclear test in 2017, KCNA mentioned a yield range, describing the warhead that had been tested as a ‘hydrogen bomb’ with a yield ‘which is adjustable from tens of kilotons to hundreds of kilotons.’ The report also stated the test demonstrated a ‘strategic purpose’ for the weapons ‘to deliver a super-powerful EMP attack over a vast area.’[2]

Another KCNA report from March 2023 referred to ‘new tactical nuclear weapons according to the purpose of the operation and targets, interchangeability with different weapons systems.’[3]

Official sources

  1. ^ KCNA. ‘Kim Jong Un Guides Work for Increasing Nuclear Arsenal’ [김정은제1비서 핵무기연구부문의 핵무기병기화사업 지도] March 9, 2016. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2016/201603/news09/20160309-01ee.html
  2. ^ KCNA. ‘Kim Jong Un Gives Guidance to Nuclear Weaponization’ [김정은위원장 핵무기병기화사업 지도]. September 3, 2017. http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2017/09/09-03/2017-0903-001.html
  3. ^ KCNA. ‘Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Work for Mounting Nuclear Warheads on Ballistic Missiles’ [김정은총비서 핵무기병기화사업 지도]. March 28, 2023. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202303/news28/20230328-01ee.html

Last updated: 2 May 2026 05:54