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India’s approach to nuclear transparency is driven by a combination of factors including external security environment and intention to maintain a credible deterrence posture while recognising the importance of nuclear risk-reduction measures.[1][2]
While the Indian government occasionally releases information about certain aspects of its nuclear capabilities — such as missile tests, doctrine, and delivery systems — it mostly maintains secrecy regarding the size, composition, and operational details of its nuclear arsenal. This includes limited transparency on nuclear warhead numbers, the specific yields of its nuclear warheads, and the dual-capable nature of its delivery systems.
Additionally, under a special safeguards agreement concluded between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2008,[5][6] some of India’s nuclear facilities and their exact operations in enrichment and reprocessing capacity and fissile material production remain classified and outside the ambit of international monitoring and oversight. Despite this, India voluntarily concluded an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA in 2014,[7] which places an added layer of monitoring and safeguards to strengthen India’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.
In terms of domestic law, the 2005 Right to Information Act (RTI) states that there is no obligation for the Indian government to disclose to citizens information that ‘would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State’; the law also allows the government to designate intelligence and security organisations and the information they provide to government as exempt from any obligation under the law.[21] In 2016, the government granted the Strategic Forces Command, which manages the Indian nuclear arsenal, such an exemption,[22] thus maintaining secrecy around the operational details related to India’s nuclear arsenal.[23]
An area where India does practice transparency is in its written nuclear doctrine, which clearly signals the intent and purpose behind the use of nuclear weapons as a war-prevention tool, rather than a war-fighting tool. India asserts an unequivocal posture of no-first-use and by extension, offers a negative security assurance (NSA) of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states. However, there is an explicit caveat involved, in the event of an attack on India conducted by a non-nuclear-armed state using chemical or biological weapons.[20]
India has also consistently engaged in mutual transparency measures with its adversaries in the name of confidence-building and nuclear risk-reduction. These include the 2005 agreement between India and Pakistan on pre-notification of surface-to-surface ballistic missile tests,[3] and the 1991 agreement between India and Pakistan prohibiting attacks on each other’s nuclear facilities,[4] amongst others.
India’s nuclear doctrine emphasises ‘survivability‘ of its nuclear forces through research and development programmes and enhancing ‘mobility and dispersal.’[9] India’s investment in emerging technologies is significant as it believes that maintaining an effective conventional capability is crucial ‘to raise the threshold of outbreak of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons’,[8] especially because India considers nuclear weapons as a deterrence tool and not a warfighting tool.[9] The government sees it as imperative to invest in new technologies such as AI, quantum computing, precision-guided weapon systems, hypersonic delivery systems, and cyber capabilities, among others. At the same time, India has maintained its stance on ethical uses of AI and emerging technologies with a human-in-the-loop approach to avoid accidental/unauthorised usage.[10]
India is selectively transparent about delivery vehicle types, especially when discussing modernization or testing activities. Government statements often highlight the dual-capable nature of missile systems and their role in ensuring maximum credibility with minimum capabilities. These include the announcement by the Ministry of Defence of the successful test launch of the Pralay missile, mentioning that it can carry ‘multiple’ types of warheads;[11] the 2023 announcement of another successful test launch of Prithvi II missile, stating that it is an integral part of ‘India’s nuclear deterrent’;[12] and the 2025 successful tests by the by the Strategic Forces Command of India’s short-range Prithvi II and Agni I missiles.[13]
India has explicitly characterised its Agni V long-range, surface-to-surface missile as nuclear-capable and reported on multiple test launches of the missile.[14][19] Similarly, in 2021, it publicised the successful test of the Agni P ballistic missile, which is also nuclear-capable.[15]
Regarding its maritime nuclear capabilities, the Indian government has disclosed details on the commissioning of its nuclear-capable submarine (SSBN) fleet, either through official channels,[16][17] or via public statements to news media.[24][25]
Finally, regarding operational readiness, India doesn’t publicly disclose the time-to-fire of its nuclear weapons, but it has consistently pointed to the dangers involved in maintaining nuclear weapons on ‘hair-trigger alert’, including the risk of accidental nuclear use.[18]
The Indian government does not disclose a comprehensive list of all its nuclear-capable (and dual-capable) delivery vehicles. It does, however, periodically announce the testing or commissioning of new delivery systems.
For example, in November 2018, the Indian government announced the completion of a ‘triad’ of nuclear delivery systems with the commissioning of the INS Arihant, an indigenously-built, nuclear-powered submarine armed with nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.[1] And in April 2026, the government publicly announced that induction of the INS Aridaman to the Indian Navy, the third of three Arihant-class submarines.[2] Also in 2026, India announced the successful test firing of the Agni-3, an intermediate-range, nuclear-capable ballistic missile with a range of more than 3000 km.[3]
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India occasionally discloses different types of nuclear-capable, including dual-capable, delivery systems it possesses. This information is often disclosed as part of any actual or planned advancements in the modernisation of the arsenal, including test launches.
In November 2018, the Prime Minister’s office announced the completion of a ‘triad’ of nuclear delivery systems with the commissioning of the INS Arihant, an indigenously built, nuclear-powered submarine armed with nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.[12] In 2024, the Defense Minister gave public remarks at the commissioning ceremony of the INS Arighaat, the second Arihant-class submarine.[5] And the Indian government invited journalists to report on the development and induction of the third Arihant-class submarine, INS Aridaman, which was inducted in 2026.[10][11]
Some official Indian statements do not mention the nuclear capabilities of specific delivery systems explicitly but signal their role in Indian nuclear deterrence indirectly. For example, the 2025 announcement by the Ministry of Defence of the successful test launch of the Pralay missile mentioned that it can carry ‘multiple’ types of warheads.[1] Similarly, the 2022 statement from the Ministry of Defence announcing the successful test launch of the short-range Prithvi II missile did not mention its dual-use nature,[2] but the 2023 announcement of another successful Prithvi II test launch stated that it is an integral part of ‘India’s nuclear deterrent’.[3]
In 2025, the Ministry of Defence announced that the Strategic Forces Command, which is responsible for India’s nuclear arsenal, had successfully test launched a Prithvi II and Agni I, another short-range missile, emphasising that ‘these tests validate key capabilities of India’s nuclear-capable delivery systems.’[4]
Since 2016, India has also publicly announced multiple successful test launches of the Agni V missile, which is a long-range, surface-to-surface missile capable of delivering Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs) and has explicitly been characterised as nuclear-capable.[6][7][8]. In 2021, India announced the test launch of the Agni P ballistic missile, which is also nuclear-capable.[9]
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India does not publicly disclose the types of fissile material enrichment or reprocessing facilities it possesses that are used for nuclear weapons purposes. There has never been an explicit government statement linking its specific reactors to production of weapons-grade fissile material. However, under the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities between India and Pakistan, which was signed in 1988 and entered into force in 1991, there is a mutual exchange of information on an annual basis, in which the two countries exchange details on the location of sensitive sites such as fuel fabrication, enrichment and reprocessing facilities.[2]
India publicly acknowledges its reprocessing activities of Spent Nuclear Fuel to extract plutonium and uranium, meant exclusively for the purposes of re-using the nuclear materials for its three-stage, closed-fuel cycle nuclear energy programme.[1] Major reprocessing facilities are housed at Tarapur and Kalapakkam sites in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu states respectively.[1]
India’s enrichment and fissile material production activities are undertaken at sites that are outside the remit of the IAEA safeguards and hence, no public information is available on these sites, except that they are used for basic research, training and production of isotopes.[3]
India’s enrichment facilities that generate fuel for its nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines include the Rare Materials Project in Rattehali, Karnataka state, which is the main centrifuge facility, as revealed in a discussion with Dr Srikumar Banerjee, then Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission of India.[3]
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The Indian government does not disclose its total holdings of low-enriched or highly enriched uranium (LEU / HEU) or plutonium.
As far as natural reserves are concerned, India possesses approximately 428,300 tonnes of in-situ uranium oxide, spread across 47 uranium deposits.[1] In addition, India plans to import 9,000 MTU (metric tonne units) of natural uranium in the period 2025 to 2033, as confirmed by a government official.[2] While the LEU requirement for some specific, foreign-built reactors such as the Tarapur Atomic Power Station 1&2 and the Kudankulum Nuclear Power Project Unit 1&2 is estimated at 40 tonnes and 150 tonnes respectively, India’s own indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors do not require LEU.[3] Additionally, the Indian government has phased out the use of HEU in reactors to prevent its misuse.[4]
India follows a strict policy of ‘reprocess to reuse’ where any spent fuel from the safeguarded nuclear reactors is fed back into the fast breeder reactors to prevent any build-up (stockpiling) of plutonium.[4]
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The Indian government does not clearly disclose whether it uses artificial intelligence in systems related to nuclear weapons development, deployment, and use. More broadly, however, it has made clear that ‘In the military domain, India is committed to its responsible use of AI’.[1] In the nuclear weapons sphere, India has emphasised that ‘the use of AI in the nuclear command and control raises questions’,[1] and that any such advancement will include a ‘human-in-the-loop’ approach, as emphasised by Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Vipul Shinghal.[2]
However, there is no confirmation as to whether India is moving towards integrating AI systems into its nuclear command and control. For now, India’s use of AI in defence remains limited to Electronic Warfare analytics, drone swarms, surveillance and cyber defence.[3][4][5] India has deployed AI in the procurement and financial management of all defence purchases, which may include dual-use delivery systems.[6]
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The Indian government occasionally and selectively discloses plans for the modernisation of its nuclear arsenal, such as the commissioning of its nuclear-capable submarine (SSBN) fleet.[1][2] On occasion, these disclosures were made via public statements to news media.[5][6] The Indian government has also consistently released its plans for the advancement in the nuclear-capable Agni missile series.[3][7][8]
Regarding the strategic rationale for India’s development of its nuclear arsenal, in a 1999 interview with the Hindu newspaper, India’s then-Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh clarified that with India’s policy of ‘retaliation only’, a ‘minimum’ deterrent cannot be a fixed quantification; ‘it is a dynamic concept but firmly rooted in the strategic environment, technological imperatives and national security needs, and the actual size, components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided taking into account all these factors.’[4]
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India’s nuclear doctrine clearly mandates a policy of no-first-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons and a negative security assurance (NSA) of ‘Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states’.[1]
However, India’s NFU and NSA pledges are conditional, as the nuclear doctrine also states, ‘However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons’.[1] As written, this includes the possibility of Indian nuclear retaliation against non-nuclear-armed states that engage in such attacks.
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In 2003, the Cabinet Committee on Security declared that ‘the nuclear doctrine and operational arrangements governing India’s nuclear assets, should be shared with the public.’
The disclosure included statements that in line with India’s no-first-use (NFU) posture,
‘nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere’[...]
‘However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.’[1]
This posture was reaffirmed in July 2022, in response to a parliamentary question to the Minister for External Affairs.[2]
Regarding its policy on the deployment and launch-readiness of nuclear warheads, India has consistently highlighted the ‘unacceptable risk of accidental use’ that results from maintaining nuclear weapons on ‘hair-trigger alert’,[3] and has called for ‘immediate and urgent steps, such as de-alerting and de-targeting.’[3][4]
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India issues advance notice of missile tests and military activities involving dual-capable weapon systems. In 2005, India entered into an agreement with Pakistan on the mutual pre-notification of surface-to-surface ballistic missile tests.[1] As part of the agreement, India also issues Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) and Navigational Warning for Mariners (NAVAREAs) to their respective authorities. The two countries also concluded a 1991 agreement on providing advance notice on military exercises and troop movements, including a timely clarification on the ‘assembly of formations, the extent, direction of the exercise and the duration’.[2]
While these agreements have stood the test of time, there have been rare instances of possible non-compliance. In 2024, Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson Mumtaz Zahra Baloch claimed that India did not strictly adhere to the 3-day advance notification period for its test launch of a nuclear-capable Agni V missile.[3]
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India‘s public statements do not explicitly draw linkages between specific strategic, non-nuclear technologies and their implications for its nuclear deterrence doctrine, other than in relation to chemical and biological weapons. Specifically, the country’s official nuclear doctrine contains the assertion that ‘in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.’[9]
However, Indian strategic thinking emphasises ‘highly effective conventional military capabilities that ‘shall be maintained to raise the threshold of outbreak of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons’ as stated by the former Minister of State for Defence, Shri MM Pallam Raju in a 2008 address.[8] This suggests that India will continue to advance its conventional capabilities, including investments in strategic non-nuclear technologies, as a part of its approach to practicing and operationalising nuclear deterrence.
In this regard, India regularly discloses its modernisation and defence plans for its military and conventional warfighting, including capabilities that can be categorised as strategic, non-nuclear technologies. These disclosures include dual-use systems such as updates on procurement plans for stealth fighter jets,[1] indigenous production of long-range and hypersonic missiles,[2] Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapon systems,[3] and precision-guided munitions.[4]
Further, in May 2025, the Indian Ministry of Defence announced its plans to clear the batch of next-generation, precision-strike, supersonic Brahmos missiles with an increased range of up to 800 km.[5][6] Additionally, the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security approved the indigenous construction of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) in 2024.[7]
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The Indian government does not disclose the total number of nuclear warheads in its arsenal, or any details on the sites used for production and storage of nuclear warheads. India pursues a policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence, meaning the country maintains a nuclear arsenal that the government believes is sufficient to provide maximum credibility with minimum forces dedicated to the role.[1]
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The Indian government does not disclose the yields of its various warheads, but it has revealed information about the yields of the nuclear test explosions it conducted in May, 1998.
Those explosions, conducted in the Pokhran desert, included five devices of different yields including sub-kiloton devices of 0.2 kt, 0.3 kt and 0.5 kt, and larger yields including a 15 kt fission device and a 45 kt thermonuclear device [1]. Later the same month, then-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Bajpayee declared India would henceforth observe a nuclear explosion test moratorium.[2]
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