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China is at once quite transparent and opaque regarding its nuclear arsenal and posture, reflecting the fact that transparency is a function of perspectives in terms of its definition, scope, degree, and form.
On one hand, China’s views on the role of nuclear weapons in its national defence, in international politics, and in terms of their employment are well documented in official statements and white papers. China has become more open over time, even regarding nuclear policy, nuclear weapons, and nuclear arms control and disarmament, albeit still in discrete areas.[1][2][3][4][5]
On the other hand, China has neither affirmed nor denied specifics related to the size of its nuclear arsenal, the types and payloads of its nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, nor production facilities for its weapons-grade fissile materials (however, see the category ‘delivery vehicle types’ for discussion of specific Chinese transparency practices in that area).
Since 16 October 1964, when it conducted its first nuclear test, Beijing has always maintained that its nuclear weapons development is largely driven by the need to respond to external forms of nuclear coercion and blackmail. Over the years, Beijing has upheld three basic principles that guide its nuclear policy. These are no-first-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons, a limited arsenal, and support of nuclear disarmament. The role of nuclear weapons as stipulated in Beijing’s official positions is purely defensive and retaliatory, rather than warfighting.[1][2][3][4][5] These positions persisted throughout the more than six decades since China acquired nuclear weapons.
This level of transparency, in terms of broad policy, general principles, and consistency, is informed by Beijing’s diplomatic practices of presenting general principles rather than outlining specific actionable plans on many international issues. For example, according to a Chinese white paper published in November 2025, entitled ‘Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era,’ nuclear transparency practices ‘should be conducive to strategic mutual trust, take full account of the security environment and interests of each country, and be implemented by themselves voluntarily in accordance with their national conditions.’ The white paper also stated, ‘Given the current international security situation, transparency in intentions and policies is of the most practical significance’ and that its ongoing commitment to a no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons ‘is the most practical measure of transparency.’[5]
This explains Beijing’s approach of emphasizing the merit of its NFU policy and challenging the other nuclear weapon states — meaning specifically the five countries defined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — to adopt the same position. Indeed, Beijing has proposed an international treaty on NFU; it ‘encourages the five nuclear-weapon States to negotiate and conclude a treaty on “mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons” or issue a political statement in this regard’.[7]
This practice of advocating general principles also applies to China’s approach to military applications of AI. Beijing calls for caution and restraint in this realm and proposes ideas for AI governance. However, these ideas are generally formulated in terms of broad principles rather than specific proposals.[6] For example, an official Chinese government summary of a 2024 meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and then-US President Joe Biden noted ‘The two Presidents affirmed the need to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons, and they stressed the need to seriously consider potential risks and adopt a prudent and responsible attitude when developing AI for the military domain.’[10]
The decision not to provide specific details on the circumstances under which it will consider the use of nuclear weapons is underpinned by the belief that not revealing critical information provides certain advantages, such as maintaining an element of surprise, and not restricting one’s freedom of action in future. This aligns with the general principle of ‘active defence’ where ‘China pursues the defensive policy featuring self-defense and gaining mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck’.[9]
Another feature of Chinese approaches to nuclear transparency is an emphasis on holistic and strategic, rather than technical and isolated, views of one’s strategic environment. This may also help to explain China’s decision not to disclose, for the most part, the numbers, types, and yields of its nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
China’s nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than the two largest nuclear-armed states, albeit it is growing and improving. China also has to consider the conventional capabilities of potential adversaries, as well as their space and missile defence capabilities, and emerging and disruptive technologies that are being integrated into the nuclear enterprise, all of which may pose serious threats to its second-strike capabilities.[5]
A key consideration for China in determining its transparency policies, as noted in the 2025 white paper on arms control, is that transparency practices should ‘be implemented by [countries] voluntarily in accordance with their national conditions.’[5] In this regard, it seems that China’s leaders have yet to be convinced that transparency can be beneficial for the country’s national security. One situation China wants to avoid is being entrapped in a position of technical inferiority. In this context, Beijing is especially adamant in rejecting recent US attempts to include China in a trilateral nuclear arms control negotiation. At a Foreign Ministry press conference on 27 August 2025, spokesperson Guo Jiakun said, ‘China’s nuclear strength is by no means on the same level with that of the U.S. Our nuclear policy and strategic security environment are also completely different. It’s neither reasonable nor realistic to ask China to join the nuclear disarmament negotiations with the U.S. and Russia’.[8]
China does not disclose the total number of nuclear-capable (including dual-capable) delivery vehicles it possesses.
Last updated: 22 April 2026 18:42
China does not make any formal disclosure regarding the types of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles it possesses. However, sites such the flagship online portal of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, www.81.cn / 中国军网, occasionally comment on the systems China has developed and deployed, as was the case during the Victory Day Parade on 3 September 2025.
Such references usually showcase advancement in China’s military modernization, including nuclear weapons, which the Chinese leadership emphasizes as China’s strategic deterrence force.[1][2][3][4][5][6] [Editor’s note: Some sources cited here are not strictly official government sources but are believed to present information approved for release by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.]
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China does not disclose information about its fissile material production or reprocessing facilities used for nuclear weapons purposes.
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China does not disclose its total holdings of low-enriched uranium, highly-enriched uranium, or plutonium.
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While China recognizes the potential benefits of AI in military applications, it has also repeatedly emphasized the imperative of maintaining human control in nuclear decisionmaking, and has highlighted the potential risks involved in AI integration in military affairs.[5] It has noted, for example, that AI is contributing to a reshaping of ‘the traditional strategic offense-defense dynamic, posing new challenges to global strategic stability.’[4]
In a position paper submitted to the United Nations in April 2025, China does not mention nuclear weapons specifically, but states, ‘a people-centered approach should be upheld. It is essential to always regard human as the final subject of responsibility and ensure that relevant weapon systems must be under human control’.[3]
In its submission to the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, the Chinese delegation stated: ‘China attaches great importance to the huge risks posed by the use of Artificial Intelligence in military domain, and advocates that countries should excise [sic] restraint in developing Artificial intelligence weapon system, ensuring the use of AI in military domain in compliance with international humanitarian law, and preventing the indiscriminate killing and injuring and malicious use of those weapon systems’.[1]
At a press conference in March 2026, PRC Ministry of National Defence spokesperson, Senior Colonel Jiang Bin pointed out, ‘Upholding a people-centered approach and the principle of AI for good, China believes that human primacy must be upheld in military applications of AI, and that all relevant weapon systems must be put under human control’.[2]
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China discloses general and broad rationales for why it believes nuclear modernization is needed but not specific plans for the future development of its nuclear arsenal or fissile material production and related facilities.
In its 2025 white paper on nuclear arms control and disarmament, it states, ‘In building a lean and effective nuclear force system, China is improving its capabilities in strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, and rapid response, as well as its survivability, in order to ensure the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear weapons and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China’.[5]
Leadership statements and various defence white papers all refer to the changing international security environments as the justification for China to continue its nuclear modernization and the imperative of building the PLA Rocket Force into a reliable, survivable, lean and effective strategic force to deter and counter nuclear coercion or blackmail.[1][2][3][4][5]
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China has on several occasions stated that it ‘unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones’.[8]
These include the 1995 statement on negative security assurances from the five ‘nuclear weapon states’ as defined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty([9] and the Chinese statement to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 2024,[10] among others.
China has also issued NSA statements in the context of its broader no-first-use (NFU) policy position.[2][3][4][5][6][7]
For example, a 2025 white paper published by the State Council Information Office affirmed, ‘China has always remained committed to the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances and unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones’.[1]
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In a 2025 white paper published by the State Council Information Office, China reiterated it ‘has always remained committed to the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances and unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.’[4]
China occasionally discloses other details on its nuclear use policy but often in abstract rather than unequivocal terms. These disclosures are normally contained in white papers on national defence, security, or arms control published by the State Council Information Office.
The 2013 white paper represents the most explicit indication of the circumstances in which China would consider the use of nuclear weapons. It states, ‘If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the PLASAF will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack either independently or together with the nuclear forces of other services’.[3] Related statements from other defence white papers since the 2010s include:
‘China pursues a nuclear strategy of self-defence, the goal of which is to maintain national strategic security by deterring other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China’.[1]
‘PLARF is enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build a strong and modernized rocket force’.[2]
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In 2009, China and Russia signed a bilateral pre-launch notification agreement for ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles, and this was extended in 2020.[2][3] According to a Russian government summary published in 2010, the agreement establishes ‘a reciprocal notification mechanism for planned and executed launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles in Russia and China in order to avoid any unclear and unforeseen situations. Information on launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles will be exchanged on a confidential basis.’[4]
In September 2024, before a scheduled ICBM launch test, China gave advanced notice to the United States and other states, reportedly including Australia, France, and New Zealand, even though there is no bilateral agreement obligating China to do so.[1]
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China does not publicly disclose its positions on how it accounts for the impact of strategic, non-nuclear technologies in its doctrine on the employment of nuclear weapons.
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China does not disclose its total number of nuclear warheads, either actively deployed or in storage, nor does it comment on others' assessments of that number.
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China does not disclose the yields of its various nuclear warheads.
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