We use cookies where necessary to allow us to understand how people interact with our website and content, so that we can continue to improve our service.
We only ever receive anonymous information, and cannot track you across other websites.
View our privacy policy
For the most part, Russia does not publicly disclose details on the size, structure, and composition of its nuclear arsenal, or its nuclear modernisation programme. Historically, the most substantial disclosures in these categories occurred within the framework of bilateral arms control agreements with the United States, most recently under the 2010 New START Treaty, until Russia suspended its participation in the Treaty in 2023.
Russia’s current position of not disclosing information on these points is explained by its assessment of the international security environment, especially the confrontation with the United States and its allies in the context of the war in Ukraine. Russia cites, for example, what it perceives as the targeting of its nuclear forces by Ukraine with the support of the United States and asserts that it has adopted transparency practices it considers appropriate to the current international security environment.[1][2]
In the framework of the Review Process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Russia argues that states must calibrate their transparency measures in line with prevailing strategic realities and national security interests. Russian officials have stated that matters involving ‘highly sensitive national security aspects’ cannot be addressed in isolation from the broader strategic situation and that increasing transparency without due consideration of strategic stability dynamics may actually heighten nuclear risk.[2]
Russia points to several actions by the United States and NATO that it sees as undermining strategic stability, viewing them as attempts to ‘achieve decisive military superiority’. These include the US deployment of a global missile defence system combined with the buildup of long-range, high-precision, non-nuclear weapons; the US advancement towards placing weapons in outer space; deploying ground-based medium-range and shorter-range missiles in various regions of the world; and the forward deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe.[3] These concerns likely inform Russia’s reluctance to engage in transparency measures related to its nuclear arsenal.
At the same time, Russia continues to engage in several nuclear transparency and risk-reduction measures that it considers appropriate under the current conditions. These include the publication of its nuclear doctrine, which details its approach to deterrence and the conditions under which it will consider the use of nuclear weapons. Russia also maintains transparency practices with the United States related to advance notifications of missile tests, rocket launches, and military exercises with nuclear forces.
Therefore, Russia seems to believe that certain transparency practices can be beneficial for its security. The transparency measures it engages in can be understood primarily as efforts to reinforce nuclear deterrence in order to avoid military conflict with the United States and its allies (e.g. the publication of the Russian nuclear doctrine), as well as to reduce the risk of miscalculation and inadvertent nuclear escalation (maintaining notification regimes).
Russia does not publicly disclose the total number of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles it possesses.
Under the now-expired New START agreement signed in 2010, Russia provided data to the United States on the number of deployed intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers, until Russia suspended its participation in the agreement in February 2023. New START had bilateral verification provisions but was not subject to verification by any third party.[1][5] Aggregate figures derived from data exchanges under New START were published twice a year by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latest disclosure provides data as of 1 September 2022.[3]
Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasised the value of transparency provided by New START, stating that it ‘played a role in maintaining balance and predictability in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons’.[4] Russia suspended its participation in the Treaty citing what it described as US policies aimed at undermining Russia’s national security. In doing so, Russia also pointed to Ukrainian attacks on several facilities covered by the Treaty, accusing the United States of assisting these attacks while simultaneously seeking inspection access to them.[5]
As a ‘nuclear-weapon state’ under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Russia has submitted national reports on its implementation of the Treaty at each review conference since 2005. These reports provide limited information on historic reductions in Russian strategic and non-strategic delivery vehicles under previous arms control treaties with the United States.[2]
Last updated: 22 April 2026 18:43
Russia does not disclose all the different types of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles it possesses.
Under the 2010 New START Treaty, Russia provided the United States with data on types of deployed and non-deployed strategic missiles and their launchers as well as heavy bombers, until suspending its participation in the Treaty in February 2023. New START had bilateral verification provisions but was not subject to verification by any third party.[1] Aggregate figures derived from data exchanges under New START were published twice a year by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latest disclosure provides data as of 1 September 2022.[4]
Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasised the value of transparency provided by New START, stating that it ‘played a role in maintaining balance and predictability in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons’.[5] Russia suspended its participation in the Treaty citing what it described as US policies aimed at undermining Russia’s national security. In doing so, Russia also pointed to Ukrainian attacks on several facilities covered by the Treaty, accusing the United States of assisting these attacks while simultaneously seeking inspection access.[6]
Information about certain types of nuclear-capable systems is occasionally disclosed through official statements and government press releases. For example, in 2024 Russia used a new type of dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) intermediate range ballistic missile in Ukraine; after the missile was used the Russian President made public statements describing the missile and its capabilities.[2][3]
Last updated: 22 April 2026 18:43
Russia has disclosed information about the types of fissile material production and reprocessing facilities it possesses that were previously used for nuclear weapons purposes.
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced in 1989, during a visit to the United Kingdom, that the Soviet Union would cease production of uranium for weapons purposes by the end of the year.[1][2] At the 1995 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Russia declared that it had stopped using newly-produced plutonium for weapons purposes and that a programme was under way to shut down the remaining facilities which had previously produced plutonium for weapons purposes.[3] In 2010, then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that the last reactor producing weapons-grade plutonium would be shut down by the end of the year.[4] Russia announced that the last reactor had been halted in its national report to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.[5]
Lists of highly enriched uranium (HEU) production sites and plutonium production sites and reactors have also been publicly disclosed to the United States in mutual data exchanges under the following bilateral treaties:
— 1993 Agreement Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons,[6]
— 1994 Agreement Concerning the Shutdown of Plutonium Production Reactors and The Cessation of Use of Newly Produced Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons,[7]
— 1997 Agreement Concerning Cooperation Regarding Plutonium Production Reactors.[8]
Last updated: 22 April 2026 18:43
Russia does not disclose its total holdings of low-enriched uranium, highly enriched uranium, or plutonium. As a ‘nuclear-weapon state’ as defined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Russia has a ‘voluntary offer agreement’ with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under which it can designate certain civilian fissile material to be placed under IAEA safeguards. Any fissile material that is not designated under the voluntary offer agreement remains exempt from IAEA safeguards.[3]
Russia only publicly discloses information about its civilian stock of plutonium, which is done under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549) published by the IAEA. These annual reports to the IAEA by the Russian State Nuclear Company (ROSATOM) include information on Russian holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent (i.e. irradiated) civil reactor fuel.[1]
Limited information about historical fissile material disposition programmes is made public through Russia’s national reports on its implementation of the NPT, submitted to NPT Review Conferences since 2005. These reports do not include quantitative data on current fissile material stocks but mention the amount of weapons-grade HEU down-blended into LEU under the Russia-US HEU-LEU Agreement.[2][4]
Last updated: 22 April 2026 18:43
Russia does not disclose its policies or operational practices regarding the use of artificial intelligence in systems related to the development, deployment, and employment of nuclear weapons. However, statements from senior military officials indicate a general view on such integration and potential areas for the application of AI.
For example, the commander of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) Sergey Karakaev stated on 17 December 2021 (designated by Presidential Decree as Strategic Rocket Forces Day) that the use of AI and robotics is being explored for automated security systems of mobile and stationary strategic missile complexes and potentially may be employed for ‘automation of certain routine operations previously performed by duty crews.[1]
Karakayev also stated in 2024 that when it comes to ‘making a decision to use nuclear weapons, replacing a human is currently inappropriate’, as AI technologies being introduced to automate even some routine operations in the RVSN have not yet been ‘fully studied and worked out’.[2]
Further clarification of Russia’s position on the use of AI in the nuclear field was disclosed in its 2026 national report to the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In that document, Russia stated that ‘the decision to use nuclear weapons is taken by the President of the Russian Federation’ and that ‘the Russian Federation ensures decisive human involvement and judgment in the field of nuclear weapons on an ongoing basis, including strict control at the level of the country’s highest military and political leadership. Against the backdrop of technological progress, this approach remains an absolute constant.’[3]
Last updated: 22 April 2026 18:43
Russia partially discloses its plans for the modernisation and future development of its nuclear arsenal and explains the strategic rationale for proposed changes. However, publicly disclosed information only outlines broad priorities and goals rather than specific dimensions of the modernisation programme. These are mainly disclosed through official statements by senior Russian officials.
The Russian modernisation programme involves the replacement of Soviet-era systems and development of new strategic delivery vehicles. Statements by senior officials broadly describe the overall progress in modernising the nuclear forces, development, deployment, and testing of some of the new delivery vehicles and priorities for further modernisation.
For example, in 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the development of new nuclear-capable delivery systems, including a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), ‘RS‑28 Sarmat’; a hypersonic glide vehicle, ‘Avangard’; an air-launched hypersonic missile, ‘Kh‑47M2 Kinzhal’; a nuclear-powered cruise missile, 9M730 ‘Burevestnik’; and a nuclear-powered, uncrewed underwater vehicle, ‘Poseidon’.[1]
Russian statements also outline the general rationale behind the modernisation plans. For example, President Putin stated in December 2025 that nuclear modernisation is ‘ensuring Russia’s strategic parity, security, and global standing’ and cited NATO as continuing to ‘actively prepare for the deployment of medium-range missiles, updating its nuclear munitions, modernising air and missile defence systems’.[2]
Last updated: 22 April 2026 18:43
Russia publicly discloses the circumstances in which it would consider the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states. As with the other four ‘nuclear weapon states’ defined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Russia has issued a negative security assurance (NSA) committing not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states.[5] However, its NSA is not unconditional.
The Russian NSA from 1995 stated: ‘Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.”[4]
Similarly, the 2024 Russian nuclear doctrine,[1] which superseded the doctrine published in 2020,[2] outlines a list of conditions under which Russia would consider employment of nuclear weapons. These conditions may apply to non-nuclear-armed states.
The 2024 doctrine includes language asserting that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons not only in response to a nuclear attack, but also to respond to a conventional aggression that creates a critical threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and Belarus. It also specifies that aggression against Russia and /or its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state is considered as their joint attack.[1]
At the 2025 Preparatory Committee meeting of the NPT, Russia stated that non-nuclear-weapon States that participate in alliances with nuclear powers or have concluded bilateral security agreements with them (states under the so-called ‘nuclear umbrella’) are excluded from the granting by Russia of any universal security assurances applicable to other States.[3]
Last updated: 22 April 2026 18:43
Russia publicly discloses its policy regarding when the employment of nuclear weapons would be considered. Russia made its nuclear doctrine publicly available for the first time in 2020.[2]
The current nuclear doctrine — Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence — was approved by an executive order of Russian President Vladimir Putin on 19 November 2024 and published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[1] It modifies and adds further details to those disclosed in 2020 regarding the conditions under which Russia would consider the employment of nuclear weapons. Based on the 2024 doctrine, these conditions are:
“a. receipt of reliable data on the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;
b. employment of nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, against facilities and (or) military formations of the Russian Federation located outside its territory;
c. actions by an adversary affecting elements of critically important state or military infrastructure of the Russian Federation, the disablement of which would disrupt response actions by nuclear forces;
d. aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) the Republic of Belarus as participants in the Union State with the employment of conventional weapons, which creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity;
e. receipt of reliable data on the massive launch (take-off) of air and space attack means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles) and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation.”
In its national report to the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2021, Russia stated that its doctrine ‘ensures the level of transparency and clearness with regard to the parameters of nuclear deterrence.’[3]
Last updated: 22 April 2026 18:43
Russia issues advance notices for some of its missile tests, space launch activities, and military exercises involving nuclear and dual-capable systems. These notices are issued under different international and bilateral regimes. The notifications are made confidentially to the relative authorities and participants in the regimes.[1][2][6][7]
Russia provides the United States with advance notifications on missile launches under the 1988 Soviet-US Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement.[1] Russia also provides the United States with advance notification on exercises that involve participation of heavy bombers under the 1989 Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises.[2] These notifications were included in the framework of the now-expired New START agreement, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in February 2023 that Russia would continue to provide these notifications even after suspending its participation in the New START Treaty.[3][4] At the 2023 Preparatory Committee meeting of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Russia framed the continued issuance of these notifications as ‘measures to maintain predictability and stability in the nuclear missile sphere.’[5]
Russia also provides advance notifications on missile launches and space launch vehicles to China under the bilateral 2009 Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles, which was extended in 2021.[6][7]
Russia also participates in the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), under which subscribing states provide pre-launch notifications of ballistic missile and space launch vehicle tests. However, the regime is voluntary and the degree to which Russia issues notifications is not known.
Last updated: 22 April 2026 18:43
Russia publicly discloses how it accounts for and responds to strategic, non-nuclear technologies in its doctrine on the employment of nuclear weapons.
The current version of Russia’s nuclear doctrine (Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence) was approved by executive order of the President in November 2024 and published in English and Russian.[1] It lists conditions under which Russia may consider the employment of nuclear weapons. These include a specification that nuclear use may be considered in response to the use of specific strategic, non-nuclear technologies.
The 2024 doctrine states that nuclear deterrence is intended to neutralise the threat of ‘possession and deployment by a potential adversary of missile defence systems and assets, intermediate- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, high-precision non-nuclear and hypersonic weapons, unmanned combat vehicles of various basing modes, directed energy weapons that can be used against the Russian Federation.’[1]
It also specifies that Russia may use nuclear weapons in response to ‘receipt of reliable data on the massive launch of air and space attack means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles) and their crossing of the state border’ of Russia.[1]
Last updated: 22 April 2026 18:43
Russia does not publicly disclose the total number of nuclear warheads in its arsenal.
Under the now-expired New START Treaty, Russia provided data to the United States on its numbers of deployed strategic warheads across intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), as well as the number of deployed heavy bombers (each heavy bomber was counted as one nuclear warhead under the New START counting rules), until Russia suspended its participation in the Treaty in February 2023. New START had bilateral verification provisions but was not subject to verification by any third party.[1]
Aggregate figures derived from data exchanges under New START were published twice a year by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latest disclosure provides data as of 1 September 2022.[3]
Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasised the value of transparency provided by New START, stating that it ‘played a role in maintaining balance and predictability in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons’.[4] Russia suspended its participation in the Treaty citing what it described as US policies aimed at undermining Russia’s national security. In doing so, Russia also pointed to Ukrainian attacks on several facilities covered by the Treaty, accusing the United States of assisting these attacks while simultaneously seeking inspection access.[5]
As a ‘nuclear-weapon state’ under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Russia has submitted national reports on its implementation of the NPT as part of the Treaty’s review process at each Review Conference since 2005. These reports provide historic information on reductions in Russian nuclear strategic and non-strategic warheads – both unilateral reductions and those conducted under previous arms control treaties with the United States.[2]
Last updated: 22 April 2026 18:43
Russia does not publicly disclose the yields of its various nuclear warheads.
Last updated: 22 April 2026 18:43