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The DPRK does not disclose the number of nuclear warheads it possesses, any detailed breakdown of its arsenal, or its total holdings of fissile materials.
Public disclosures from the DPRK regarding its fissile material production serve to demonstrate the existence of the relevant facilities, but do not reveal their specific outputs, capacity, or the related fissile material stockpiles.
The DPRK also does not disclose information about its policies or practices related to the integration of AI and other emerging technologies into its nuclear weapon systems. However, the country’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un has stated that the integration of AI technologies is a top priority for its military modernization.[16]
The DPRK has occasionally issued pre-notification of some missile test launches or space launch activities to international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, and the International Civil Aviation Organization.[11][12] However, the cadence of these notifications is inconsistent, and their release does not constitute a regular or comprehensive practice across all missile tests and space launch activities.[13][14][15]
While few details are released overall on the nuclear weapons programme, the DPRK has disclosed more information about the programme in recent years than it tended to previously. For example, the DPRK’s publicly released five-year plan from 2021 includes discussion of defence issues and offered rare insights into its strategic priorities.[17]
Similarly, statements released by the state news agency, KCNA, after each of the six nuclear tests the DPRK has conducted to date have gradually become more detailed, including as regards the rationale for its nuclear weapons. After the fourth nuclear test on 6 January 2016, which the DPRK described as its first hydrogen bomb test, KCNA provided a clearer timeline for the decision-making process than it had previously.[6] Kim Jong Un ‘issued an order to conduct the first H-bomb test … on December 15, Juche 104 (2015) … and then signed the final written order on January 3, Juche 105 (2016)].’[5]
After the fifth nuclear test, on 9 September 2016, the KCNA announcement stated ‘The standardization of the nuclear warhead will enable the DPRK to produce at will, and as many as it wants, a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power with a firm hold on the technology for producing and using various fissile materials.’[7] Throughout all six tests, official DPRK communications have consistently emphasised the safe testing conditions and the self-defensive nature of the nuclear and missile programmes.[1][2][3][6][7][8]
The 2022 law on Nuclear Forces Policy governs North Korean nuclear weapons. The 2022 law provides clearer command-and-control provisions for nuclear use than the 2013 law that it replaced,[4] and it lists a set of conditions in which the DPRK would consider using nuclear weapons.[9] These include:
1. if a nuclear attack or an attack by another weapon of mass destruction has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;
2. if a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on the state leadership or the state nuclear command apparatus by hostile forces has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;
3. if major strategic assets of the state have suffered a devastating military attack or when such an attack is judged to be imminent;
4. if there is an unavoidable operational need during a crisis to prevent the escalation or prolongation of war and to seize the initiative in the war; or
5. if there is no choice but to respond with nuclear weapons following the occurrence of a crisis with devastating consequences for the survival of the state or the lives and safety of the people.
Over the last few years, the DPRK has publicly articulated a non-negotiable rejection of the concept of ‘denuclearization’. At the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly in 2025, Kim Jong Un reiterated this rejection, saying ‘The concept of denuclearization has already lost its meaning…Asking us to accept denuclearization now is as good as asking us to go against our Constitution… denuclearization is the last, last thing to expect from us.’[10] This also illustrates a sense of strategic transparency; while remaining opaque about many of its capabilities and operational policies, the DPRK uses transparency selectively to clarify red lines.
The DPRK does not disclose the total number of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles it possesses. However, state media (KCNA) reveals certain information about delivery vehicles when reporting on missile tests or the unveiling of new weapons systems.
At a ceremony in August 2024, for example, Kim Jung-Un handed over 250 ‘new-type tactical ballistic missile launchers’ to the ‘frontier military units.’[1]
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Overall, the DPRK discloses very limited information on its nuclear-capable delivery systems, usually on occasions such as missile test launches, visits by the country’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un to key military facilities, and major national events.
In 2013, DPRK state media (KCNA) reported that the country had conducted its third nuclear test with a ‘smaller, lighter atomic bomb’ and emphasized the importance of developing ‘more precise and miniaturized nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.’[1][2]
KCNA reported in March 2016 that the ‘nuclear warheads have been standardized to be suitable for ballistic missiles by miniaturizing them’ and ‘with a Korean-style structure of mixed charge.’[5]
In 2021, Kim Jong Un stated the intention to ‘make the existing nuclear weapons tactical ones.’[3] During the 2025 military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Worker’s Party of Korea, the Hwasongpho-20 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was presented as ‘the most powerful nuclear strategic weapon system.’[4]
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The DPRK discloses little information about the types of fissile material production or reprocessing facilities it possesses that are used for nuclear weapons purposes.
Sites disclosed by the DPRK include Nyongbyon and a facility that was under construction in Taechon at one point, as referenced in the 1994 Agreed Framework signed between the DPRK and the United States.[1][2][3][6] In April 2009, in response to a statement from the president of the UN Security Council, the DPRK Foreign Ministry also stated an intention to build an experimental light-water reactor: ‘In case the UNSC does not make an immediate apology, we will…decide to build a light-water reactor power plant and begin immediately the technological development to ensure our own production of nuclear fuel.’[7]
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs first publicly acknowledged the possession of a uranium enrichment capability in June 2009, when government media reported that in response to UNSC Resolution 1874, ‘The process of uranium enrichment will be commenced.’[9]
Official state media (KCNA) also occasionally mentions the names of facilities that produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes, such as the Nuclear Weapons Institute.[8] In 2025, it reported on Kim Jong Un’s interactions with scientists from the nuclear-material production base and the Nuclear Weapons Institute and posted photos of him inspecting the related facilities, though the DPRK has not disclosed their locations or technical parameters.[4][5]
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The DPRK does not disclose its total holdings of low-enriched uranium, highly enriched uranium, or plutonium.
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The DPRK does not publicly disclose its policies regarding the integration of AI into its nuclear weapons systems. However, the country’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong Un, has stated that the integration of AI technologies is a top priority for its military modernization.[1]
For example, during a visit to the Unmanned Aeronautical Technology Complex and the detective electronic warfare research group in March 2025, Kim stated that ‘in the effort to modernize the armed forces, the sectors of unmanned equipment and AI technology must be regarded as top priorities for development’.[1]
And at the opening ceremony of the Arms Equipment Exhibition in October 2025, Kim stressed the importance of ‘actively introducing AI and other cutting-edge technology which could not only expand our warfighting capabilities but also our adaptability to current and future battlefields.’[2]
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The DPRK has disclosed plans for the modernisation or future development of its nuclear arsenal and explained the strategic rationale for the proposed changes.
At the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in 2021, Kim Jong Un announced the modernization plan for the next five years to ‘further advance nuclear technology, the miniaturization and lightening of nuclear weapons, the development of tactical nuclear weapons, and the production of ultra-large nuclear warheads.’ This plan also include the ‘goal to improve the preemptive and retaliatory strike of nuclear forces…within the 15,000 km range’ and the ‘task to establish hypersonic glide combat unit in the near future, ground-based and sea-based solid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as nuclear-powered submarines and underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapons which are of important significance in raising the long-range nuclear strike capability.’[1]
Kim has stressed that the country will pursue ‘a rapid expansion of nuclearization’ and emphasized the important role of naval forces to perform as a part of ‘state nuclear forces and the realm of nuclear use in the near future.’[2]
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According to the 2022 law on Nuclear Forces Policy, the DPRK states that it shall not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states if these states are not involved in ‘any aggression or attack against the DPRK in league with other nuclear-armed states].’[1]
In addition to this general provision that specifically mentions non-nuclear-armed states, Article 6 of the law on Nuclear Forces Policy outlines five conditions under which the DPRK would consider the use of nuclear weapons, and these conditions may be met regardless of whether an adversary is nuclear-armed or not:
1. if a nuclear attack or an attack by another weapon of mass destruction has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;
2. if a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on the state leadership or the state nuclear command apparatus by hostile forces has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;
3. if major strategic assets of the state have suffered a devastating military attack or when such an attack is judged to be imminent;
4. if there is an unavoidable operational need during a crisis to prevent the escalation or prolongation of war and to seize the initiative in the war; or
5. if there is no choice but to respond with nuclear weapons following the occurrence of a crisis with devastating consequences for the survival of the state or the lives and safety of the people.[1]
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The DPRK has twice disclosed its laws governing the use of nuclear weapons. The current law on ‘Nuclear Forces Policy’, published in 2022, outlines five conditions in which the DPRK would consider the use of nuclear weapons. These are:
1. if a nuclear attack or an attack by another weapon of mass destruction has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;
2. if a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on the state leadership or the state nuclear command apparatus by hostile forces has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;
3. if major strategic assets of the state have suffered a devastating military attack or when such an attack is judged to be imminent;
4. if there is an unavoidable operational need during a crisis to prevent the escalation or prolongation of war and to seize the initiative in the war; or
5. if there is no choice but to respond with nuclear weapons following the occurrence of a crisis with devastating consequences for the survival of the state or the lives and safety of the people.[3]
The 2022 law on Nuclear Forces Policy replaced an older law from 2013 entitled ‘On Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State for Self-Defence.’[1][2]
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The DPRK has on occasion provided notifications to organizations such as the International Maritime Organization, International Telecommunications Union and International Civil Aviation Organization.[1][2] However, this is not a consistent practice for all its missiles tests and space launch activities.[3][4][5]
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In its 2022 law on Nuclear Forces Policy, the DPRK discloses a range of circumstances in which it would consider using nuclear weapons.[1] These include situations in which the DPRK has suffered a strategic attack, or believes one is imminent, using non-nuclear means. The conditions are as follows:
1. if a nuclear attack or an attack by another weapon of mass destruction has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;
2. if a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on the state leadership or the state nuclear command apparatus by hostile forces has been carried out or is judged to be imminent;
3. if major strategic assets of the state have suffered a devastating military attack or when such an attack is judged to be imminent;
4. if there is an unavoidable operational need during a crisis to prevent the escalation or prolongation of war and to seize the initiative in the war; or
5. if there is no choice but to respond with nuclear weapons following the occurrence of a crisis with devastating consequences for the survival of the state or the lives and safety of the people.[1]
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The DPRK government does not disclose the total number of nuclear warheads in its arsenal, nor any details regarding the numbers of warheads in different functional categories. In December 2022, however, Kim Jong Un emphasized the intention to pursue ‘an exponential increase of the country’s nuclear arsenal’.[1]
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The DPRK has not disclosed the exact yields of its nuclear warheads. However, state media (KCNA) has reported on a series of inspections conducted by the DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un during the development of the country’s nuclear arsenal, in which details about various warheads were disclosed.
For example, following an inspection conducted by Kim in March 2016, KCNA reported that the ‘nuclear warheads have been standardized to be suitable for ballistic missiles by miniaturizing them’ and ‘with a Korean-style structure of mixed charge.’[1]
Following the sixth nuclear test in 2017, KCNA mentioned a yield range, describing the warhead that had been tested as a ‘hydrogen bomb’ with a yield ‘which is adjustable from tens of kilotons to hundreds of kilotons.’ The report also stated the test demonstrated a ‘strategic purpose’ for the weapons ‘to deliver a super-powerful EMP attack over a vast area.’[2]
Another KCNA report from March 2023 referred to ‘new tactical nuclear weapons according to the purpose of the operation and targets, interchangeability with different weapons systems.’[3]
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